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Abstract
Quantum theory plays an increasingly significant role in contempo-
rary early-universe cosmology, most notably in the inflationary origins
of the fluctuation spectrum of the microwave background radiation. I
consider the two main strategies for interpreting (as opposed to modify-
ing or supplementing) standard quantum mechanics in the light of cos-
mology. I argue that the conceptual difficulties of the approaches based
around an irreducible role for measurement - already very severe - be-
come intolerable in a cosmological context, whereas the approach based
around Everett’s original idea of treating quantum systems as closed sys-
tems handles cosmological quantum theory satisfactorily. Contemporary
cosmology, which indeed applies standard quantum theory without sup-
plementation or modification, is thus committed - tacitly or explictly - to
the Everett interpretation.
Cosmology is the killer app for the Everett interpretation.
Jim Hartle.1
1 States, dynamics, and the Objective view of
physics
Pretty much any classical-mechanical theory, be it Newtonian particle mechan-
ics, or the behaviour of coiled springs, or classical field theory, or general rela-
tivity, has a standard mathematical form — or at any rate can be put into that
standard form. It is specified by:
1. A state space S: a set of points with at least enough structure to define
concepts of differentiation.
1Presentation to “Everett@50” conference: Oxford 19th-21st July 2007.
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2. A dynamics on S: a first-order differential equation that determines,
through each point in S, a path satisfying that equation. (Furthermore,
the path is either unique, or — as in the case of gauge theories — its
non-uniqueness is taken to indicate a many-to-one relation between the
mathematics and the physics.)
In Newtonian particle mechanics, for instance, the state space is the space of N -
tuples of points in 3-dimensional Euclidean space, and the dynamics is Newton’s
second law together with some expression for the force. In scalar field theory,
the state space is the space of functions from Euclidean space to the real (or
complex) numbers, and the dynamics is some field equation like the Klein-
Gordon equation.
It is possible to have debates that might be called “interpretational” about
these classical theories. Philosophers can debate — indeed, have debated —
whether genuine point particles are objects in their own right or simply deriva-
tive on some primitive property of “occupation” that spacetime points do or do
not possess; they have asked whether a “field” is an object whose parts occupy
spacetime points, or simply a facon de parler for ascribing certain properties to
spacetime points, or even whether the fact that ordinary language allows us to
ask such questions shows that we need to approach metaphysics in a way more
suited to physics. In the case of gauge theories their concerns have overlapped
with physicists’ in exploring the nature of the gauge principle and the status of
spacetime concepts in general relativity.
But none of these questions amount to genuine dispute about ‘interpretation’
of the kind found in quantum theory. For the basic relation between theory and
world is not in contention in any of these classical theories. In each case, a simple
recipe applies for any physical system described by some classical theory:
1. At each instant of time, the physical features of the system are represented
by the state. That is: the state objectively represents the way the physical
system actually is.
2. The equation of motion of the system determines how those physical fea-
tures change. That is, the trajectory in state space determined by the
dynamics is a representation of the actual history of the system.
Call this the Objective view of physics. (I have elsewhere (Wallace 2013) called
it, or something very similar, the dynamical conception of physics.) It is a view
in which measurement and observation are sidelined: for sure, a sufficiently
canny physicist may measure the system and so learn part or all of the truth
about the system’s history, but:
• That measurement process is external to the formalism of the theory; that
formalism describes only the uninterrupted evolution of the system.
• The goal of a measurement process is to determine the objective, already-
true facts about the system’s state at any given time, and no barrier of
principle prevents that goal being achieved arbitrarily well.
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• While realistically a measurement process may disturb a system’s evolu-
tion, that disturbance is not an essential part of measurement, and no
barrier of principle prevents a measurement leaving a system undisturbed
to arbitrarily high levels of accuracy.
The objective view is, in itself, silent about the actual process of measurement:
measurement, in idealisation, is just some process whereby a physicist comes
to know the facts about the system, while the system itself continues blithely
on. Should we wish to go beyond this level of idealisation and actually ask
how the measurement process works, the Objective view gives a simple recipe:
measurement devices are just physical systems themselves, with their own state
spaces and dynamics, and a “measurement” is just a dynamical coupling of
the measurement device with the system being measured, with the result that
the measurement device’s state post-measurement ends up correlated with the
measured system’s state pre-measurement.
Of course, in most cases where we apply classical physics, representing the
actual process of measurement inside the physics is impossible at anything be-
yond the most phenomenological level (not least because real measurement de-
vices are made of atoms, which are unstable classically!) But the principles of
application are nonetheless clear.
The same holds when we go beyond standard classical mechanics and con-
sider stochastic theories, such as Brownian motion or the Langevin equation.
The deterministic dynamics is replaced with a stochastic differential equation
determining a probability distribution over a state’s future histories, but the
interpretation is unchanged: those future histories are the possible histories
the system will actually have, and measurement will simply tell us which one
actually obtains.
2 Quantum theory and the Objective View
A quantum theory — be it non-relativistic particle physics, or a collection of
interacting oscillators, or a quantum field theory — formally has the same
structure as a classical theory. Its state space is the space of rays in some Hilbert
space, or if preferred, the space of density operators on that same Hilbert space
Its dynamics is given by a semigroup of unitary operators determined by the
Schro¨dinger equation.
To take the Objective view of quantum theory, though, would require us to
interpret a point in the state space as representing a possible physical state of
the world — and in quantum theory that is non-trivial. The problem is not that
Hilbert space is a featureless mathematical space, in which no two rays can be
distinguished. After all, the state space in classical mechanics — phase space
— is, qua phase space, almost as featureless. A phase space is just defined as
a symplectic manifold, and any two points in such a space related by a canoni-
cal transformation are indistinguishable with respect to the structure of such a
space. But two so-related points in phase space can still represent intrinsically
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different physical possibilities, because any particular classical-mechanical the-
ory has a great deal of structure on its phase space beyond that defined by the
basic formalism of classical mechanics. The phase space of N -particle mechan-
ics, for instance, is equipped with a preferred decomposition into one-particle
phase spaces, each of which in turn comes with a preferred action of the sym-
metry group of spacetime on it; the phase space of a field theory comes with a
preferred identification between points in physical space and functions on the
phase space.2
Likewise, the Hilbert space of any particular quantum system is highly struc-
tured, with the structure typically given by a preferred relation between self-
adjoint operators and either some spacetime symmetry group or else the space-
time itself. In a quantum field theory, in particular, the field operator is (speak-
ing somewhat formally) a map from points x in space to operators Ψ̂(x) on the
Hilbert space.
The problem, rather, is that quantum theory also comes equipped with an
interpretative rule — the Born Rule (or probability postulate) — that seems at
odds with any use of this preferred structure to determine objectively-possessed
properties of a quantum system. The Born Rule, in its most minimal form (to be
expanded upon later) tells us that the result of measuring the possessed value of
some quantity represented by operator X̂ is determined only probabilistically by
the state |ψ〉, and that the expectation value of that measurement is 〈ψ| X̂ |ψ〉.
This, of course, leads swiftly to trouble for the Objective View. From the
Born rule it follows that measurements of (the quantity represented by) X̂ give
a deterministic result iff the state |ψ〉 is an eigenstate of X̂. On the Objective
View, measurement is simply a process of recording already-possessed values;
hence, an Objective view of quantum mechanics tells us that if X̂ |x〉 = x |x〉,
|x〉 represents a system with possessed value x of the quantity. But then it is
obscure what to make of a superposition like
|ψ〉 =
∑
i
λi |xi〉 . (1)
Measurement will give some xi as a result, yet |ψ〉 itself tells us nothing of
which xi will result. And this looks to be in flat contradiction with the Objec-
tive View: if measurement simply returns an actually-possessed value of that
which is measured, and if the state of the system is supposed to represent the
physical features of the system being measured, then that state must represent
the actually-possessed value — yet it manifestly does not, when one measure-
ment of a system in state |ψ〉 can give one result and a second measurement on
a system in the very same state can give quite another.
2Sometimes ‘phase space’ is defined more richly, as the cotangent bundle to a differentiable
manifold (the ‘configuration space’). But the same basic point goes through: the structure
qua phase space is preserved by any cotangent lift of a diffeomorphism on the configuration
space, so any points related by such a cotangent lift are indistinguishable with respect to the
phase-space structure; in reality, any concrete example of a classical-mechanical theory places
a great deal of structure on the configuration space, and it is largely that structure which
allows different points in phase space to represent distinguishable physical possibilities.
4
What to do? At least in foundational circles, there is a strong temptation to
modify or supplement quantum mechanics in some manner so as to preserve as
much as possible of the Objective View. But while much can be said in favour of
this temptation, it must be acknowledged that physics seems to have got by for
85 years without any apparent need of such modification. Furthermore, the most
fully developed such modifications — the hidden-variable theory of de Broglie
and Bohm (cf Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993; Holland 1993; Cushing, Fine,
and Goldstein 1996) and the dynamical-collapse theories of Ghirardi, Rimini,
and Weber (1986) and Pearle (1989) — are effectively toy models, restricted to
the domain of non-relativistic particle mechanics in the absence of electromag-
netic radiation. While there have been serious attempts to extend these theories
to the relativistic domain (Colin and Struyve 2007, Struyve and Westman 2006,
2007, Tumulka 2006, Bedingham 2010, 2011), it’s fair to say that there is so
far no such generally-accepted extension to an empirically adequate effective
field theory like electroweak theory or the full Standard Model, let alone to the
post-Standard-Model physics typically appealed to in contemporary inflationary
cosmology.3
As such, the urgent priority for advocates of the ”modify or supplement”
strategy is (or ought to be) to develop robust extensions of their theories to
the full range of contemporary physics. There is a place for philosophical ex-
plorations of these theories, but that exploration needs to be tentative and
provisional, and not overcommitted to precise details of the existing models; in
the meantime, the main problems of these approaches are technical rather than
philosophical (they were, after all, designed precisely so as to resolve the main
philosophical problems with quantum theory).
By contrast, if we want to understand the apparently-successful application
of extant quantum theory in contemporary cosmology (and indeed in contem-
porary physics more generally), our problem is essentially philosophical. We
seem in practice to be able to apply the theory despite the apparent failure of
the Objective View: we need to understand if this practice can be underpinned
by a conceptually sound understanding of quantum theory.
3 The Lab View
The Born Rule is phrased in terms of measurement, and from the earliest days
of quantum physics it has been interpreted in a way which gives measurement a
central conceptual role, in sharp contrast with the passive, external-monitoring
view of measurement seen in the Objective View. We can make this role explicit
in an alternative approach to a physical theory, which might be called the Lab
View: it can fairly be said to underpin many textbook discussions of quantum
3There have been highly interesting attempts to develop testable alternatives to that con-
temporary cosmology using principles from hidden-variable physics (where those theories are
understood phenomenologically and schematically); see, e. g. , Valentini (2010), Underwood
and Valentini (2015), Goldstein, Struyve, and Tumulka (2016). This work lies outside the
scope of this paper; its ultimate test is experimental.
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theory (here I follow in particular Peres (1993)).
In the Lab View, any application of a physical theory should be understood
as applying to some experimental setup. That setup in turn is broken into three
processes:
1. State preparation;
2. Dynamics;
3. State measurement.
The first and last of these are primitive: the question of how the system is
prepared in a given state, and how it is measured, are external to the experiment
and so not modelled in the physics. Only the second is regarded as a modelled
physical process.
In quantum mechanics, in particular:
1. The system is prepared in a state represented by some (pure or mixed)
Hilbert-space state;
2. It evolves under the Schro¨dinger equation for some fixed period of time;
3. The quantity being measured is represented by a self-adjoint operator,
and the measurement outcome is given probabilistically by the Born rule,
with respect to the time-evolved state and self-adjoint operator.
The Lab View itself does not force a unique interpretation of the underlying
physics, but those interpretations compatible with it inevitably give a special
status to measurement. Particularly prominent are:
Straight operationalism: There is nothing more to quantum mechanics than
a calculus that connects preparation processes (conceived of macroscop-
ically and phenomenologically) to measurement processes (likewise con-
ceived of); physics neither needs, nor can accommodate, any microscopic
story linking the two.
Straight operationalism is perhaps the closest realisation in mainstream
physics of the old logical-positivist conception of the philosophy of science;
it seems to have been more or less Heisenberg’s preferred approach, and
has been advocated more recently by Peres (Peres 1993, pp.373–429, Fuchs
and Peres 2000). The ‘quantum Bayesianism’ or “QBism” of Fuchs et al
(Fuchs 2002; Fuchs, Mermin, and Schack 2014; Fuchs and Schack 2015)
has much in common with straight operationalism, although it holds out
for some objective physical description at a deeper level (see Timpson
(2010, pp.188–235) for a critique).
Complementarity: It is possible to describe a physical system at the micro-
scopic level, but the appropriate description depends on the experimental
context in question. Is an electron a wave or a particle? If you’re carrying
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out a two-slit experiment, it’s a wave; if you change experimental context
to check which slit it went down, it’s a particle.
Niels Bohr is the most famous proponent of complementarity, though he
tended to describe it in qualitative terms and engaged little with mod-
ern (Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg-Dirac) quantum mechanics. Saunders (2005)
provides a rational reconstruction of complementarity in modern termi-
nology; the approaches of Omnes (1988, 1992, 1994) and Griffiths (1984,
1993, 1996) are very much in the spirit of complementarity.
Measurement-induced collapse: The system can be described in microscopic
terms, and in a way independent of the measurement process: the physi-
cal quantities of the system are represented by the state, and the system
has a definite value of the quantity represented by operator X̂ iff its state
is an eigenvector of X̂ (the ‘Eigenvalue-Eigenvector link’), or perhaps iff
it is very close to an eigenvector (the ‘Fuzzy link’; cf Albert and Loewer
(1996)). But at the final moment of measurement at the end of the exper-
iment, the state discontinuously jumps (‘collapses’) into an eigenstate of
the operator being measured, with the probability of a jump being given
by the Born rule.
Dirac (1930) and von Neumann (1955) both interpreted quantum me-
chanics via measurement-induced collapse, and it is the approach most
often seen in introductory textbooks today. Physicists often call it the
Copenhagen interpretation, though historically that term is better used
to describe the philosophies of Bohr and Heisenberg (philosophers often
call it the Dirac-von Neumann interpretation). Strictly speaking it is not
a pure intepretation of quantum theory, since the collapse of the wavefunc-
tion is a one-off modification of the dynamics, but since it is introduced
for purely philosophical reasons and is undefined beyond the statement
that it happens ‘at measurement’, it has more in common with other pure
interpretations than with genuine modifications of quantum theory.
The Lab View is often criticised on philosophical grounds, as part of the
general rejection of operationalism in contemporary philosophy of physics (see
Newton-Smith (1981, ch.II), Psillos (1999, chs.1-2), and references therein for
philosophical discussion, and Deutsch (1997) and Bell (2004) for physicists’
versions of the same critique). But these criticisms — though quite correct! —
are not my concern here. In fact there are straightforwardly scientific grounds
to reject the Lab View (or at least to recognise it as a special case of something
more general). Firstly, it fails to do full justice to the practice of experimental
physics; secondly, and of particular relevance to cosmology, it fails to allow for
applications of quantum theory in situations which don’t fit the ‘experiment’
framework at all.
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4 Limitations of the Lab View: real experiments
A measurement apparatus or a state-preparation device (my experimentalist
colleagues assure me) is not an unanalysed gift from God: it is made of atoms,
and designed and built on the assumption that its behaviour is governed by
physical laws.
Which laws? Back in the glory days of the Copenhagen intepretation, per-
haps it was possible to suppose that the workings of lab equipment should be
analysed classically, but in these days of quantum optics, superconducting su-
percolliders and gravity-wave-sensitive laser interferometers, we cannot avoid
making extensive reference to quantum theory itself to model the workings of
our apparatus. And now a regress beckons: if we can understand quantum
theory only with respect to some experimental context, what is the context in
which we understand the application of quantum theory to the measurement
itself?
Relatedly: how should we apply quantum mechanics in the case of repeated
measurements, where we measure a given quantity not once but twice or many
times? It is sometimes suggested that the Dirac-von Neumann collapse postulate
solves this problem, and indeed (not least by Dirac himself) that the collapse
postulate is justified precisely to ensure that measurement is repeatable.
But this will not do. Typical measurement processes are not repeatable:
standard methods of detecting a photon, for instance, absorb and destroy that
photon (at least, such is the language we usually use, however dubious it might
be on the Lab View). To suppose that the collapse postulate is there only to
ensure that repeatable measurements are repeatable is to court tautology, and
at any rate does not answer the general problem of how to analyse experiments
involving multiple measurement processes.
The limit of repeated measurements is continuous observation. This is rou-
tine in physics: the Geiger counter clicks when the nucleus has decayed, but that
counter does not operate in a discrete fashion. Trying to discretise this process,
apply a collapse postulate, and take the limit leads to disaster: as Misra and
Sudarshan (1977) observed, in that limit the quantum Zeno effect entirely halts
evolution, and it was for exactly that reason that they initially called it a ‘para-
dox’. (It is telling that while Schro¨dinger’s original ‘cat’ thought experiment
involved a decaying nucleus and so a continuously-changing amplitude for the
cat to die, modern analyses usually discretise the process.)
For all this, physics clearly does succeed in applying quantum theory to these
experimental contexts, and so must in some way go beyond the Lab View to do
so. The method is in each case the same:
1. Expand the analysis to include the apparatus itself as part of the quantum
system. (In quantum information this move has come to be known as ‘the
Church of the Larger Hilbert Space’.)
2. Avoid the regress by treating the Born-Rule-derived probability distribu-
tion over macroscopic degrees of freedom not as a probability of getting
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certain values on measurement, but as a probability of certain values al-
ready being possessed.
Schematically, a measurement process of, say, a spin-half particle looks like
(α |↑〉+ β |↓〉)⊗ |‘ready’〉 → α |ϕ↑〉⊗|‘up’〉+ β |ϕ↓〉⊗|‘down’〉 (2)
where |‘ready’〉, |‘up’〉 and |‘down’〉 represent states of a macroscopic measure-
ment device whose macroscopic variables have approximately definite results
picking out the appropriate measurement outcomes. (In a realistic analysis
of the device’s function, of course, there would actually be a high-dimensional
subspace corresponding to each of these results, and not just a single state.) Ap-
plying the Born rule directly to these variables tells us that before measurement,
the device had a 100% chance of being in the ‘ready’ state; after measurement,
a |α|2 chance of being in the ‘up’ state and a |β|2 chance of being in the ‘down’
state.
If we wish to measure the state of the particle twice, we need a second
copy of the measurement device — and its outcome will depend on the post-
measurement states |ϕ↑〉 and |ϕ↓〉. In the case where |ϕ↑〉 = |↑〉 and |ϕ↓〉 = |↓〉
— which by definition we call ‘non-disturbing’ — the result (assuming both
devices work the same way) is
(α |↑〉+ β |↓〉)⊗ |‘ready’〉 ⊗ |‘ready’〉 →
α |ϕ↑〉⊗|‘up’〉 ⊗ |‘up’〉+ β |ϕ↓〉⊗|‘down’〉 ⊗ |‘down’〉 (3)
and the Born rule tells us that the two devices have a 100% chance to agree on
the measurement outcome. At the other extreme, if the measurement process
leaves the state of the system in the spin-up state irrespective of its original
state — that is, |ϕ↑〉 = |ϕ↓〉 = |↑〉 — then the measurement evolution will give
(α |↑〉+ β |↓〉)⊗ |‘ready’〉 ⊗ |‘ready’〉 →
|↑〉 ⊗ (α |‘up’〉+ β |‘down’〉)⊗ |‘up’〉 (4)
and the Born Rule tells us that the second measurement is certain to give result
‘up’ irrespective of the result of the first.
Similarly, continuous measurement processes (such as the Geiger counter)
can be modelled as interactions whereby the measurement device evolves (at
some fixed response rate) from a ‘ready’ to a ‘triggered’ state when the system’s
state is in some region of Hilbert space and remains static otherwise. If the
system evolves from the static to the trigger region, then depending on how
the speed of the system’s evolution compares with the detector response rate,
the detector may passively record the transition or may halt it almost entirely
through Zeno-type effects with a smooth transition between the two regimes as
the respective timescales are varied (cf Home and Whitaker (1997) for further
discussion). In the particular case of the Geiger counter, its response rate is
so slow compared to the transition rate of nuclear decay that Zeno freezing is
negligible.
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To sum up: both the general technological problem of constructing mea-
surement devices, and the more specific problems that occur when we consider
experimental contexts more general than the stylised ones used in the Lab View,
force us to expand the system studied by quantum theory to include the mea-
surement device itself; having done so, we no longer consider the supposed ‘mea-
surement context’ of that larger system, but just apply the Born Rule directly
to the macroscopic degrees of freedom.
This need for an objective, non-quantum, macroscopically applicable lan-
guage to describe the physics of measurement was already recognised by Bohr
(and is acknowledged in more sophisticated operationalist accounts of quantum
theory; cf. Peres (1993, 423–427)). As we shall see, it is really a special case of
a more general requirement.
5 Limitations of the Lab View: beyond the ‘ex-
periment’ paradigm
It has long been suggested that Lab View quantum mechanics is unsuitable for
cosmology simply because cosmology concerns the whole Universe, and so there
is no ‘outside measurement context’; indeed, it was for exactly these reasons
that Hugh Everett developed his approach to quantum theory in the first place
(Everett 1957).
However, this slightly misidentifies the problem. Cosmology is concerned
with the Universe on its largest scales, but not with every last feature of the
Universe: realistic theories in cosmology concern particular degrees of freedom
of the universe (the distribution of galaxies, for instance) and we can perfectly
well treat these degrees of freedom as being measured via their interaction with
other degrees of freedom outside the scope of those theories (Fuchs and Peres
2000).
But there is a problem nonetheless. Namely: the processes studied in cos-
mology cannot, even in the loosest sense, be forced into the Lab View. They are
(treated as) objective, ongoing historical processes, tested indirectly via their
input into other processes; they are neither prepared in some state at the be-
ginning, nor measured at the end, and indeed in many cases they are ongoing.
In fact, this is not an issue specific to cosmology. The luminosity of the Sun,
for instance, is determined in part via quantum mechanics: in particular, via
the quantum tunneling processes that control the rate of nuclear fusion in the
Sun’s core as a function of its mass and composition. We can model this fairly
accurately and, on the basis of that model, can deduce how the Sun’s luminosity
has increased over time. Astrophysicists pass that information to climate scien-
tists, geologists, and paleontologists, who feed it into their respective models of
prehistoric climates, geological processes, and ecosystems. All good science —
but only in the most Procrustean sense can we realistically regard a successful
fit to data in a paleoclimate model as being a measurement of the nuclear fusion
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processes in the Sun a billion years ago.4
Issues of this kind abound whenever we apply quantum theory outside stylised
lab contexts. (Is the increased incidence of cancer due to Cold War nuclear-
weapons tests a quantum measurement of the decay processes in the fallout
products of those tests?) In each case we seem to have extracted objective facts
about the unobserved world from quantum theory, not merely to be dealing with
a mysterious microworld that gets its meaning only when observed. But they
are particularly vivid in cosmology, which is a purely observational science, and
a science chiefly concerned not with repeating events in the present but with
the historical evolution of the observed Universe as a whole.
As perhaps the most dramatic example available — and probably the most
important application of quantum theory in contemporary cosmology — con-
sider the origin of structure in the Universe. Most of that story is classical:
we posit a very small amount of randomly-distributed inhomogeneity in the
very-early Universe, and then plug that into our cosmological models to de-
termine both the inhomogeneity in the cosmic microwave background and the
present-day distribution of galaxies. The latter, in particular, requires very ex-
tensive computer modelling that takes into account astrophysical phenomena on
a great many scales; it cannot except in the most indirect sense be regarded as a
‘measurement’ of primordial inhomogeneity. Quantum theory comes in as a pro-
posed source of the inhomogeneity: the posited scalar field (the ‘inflaton field’)
responsible for cosmic inflation is assumed to be in a simple quantum state in
the pre-inflationary Universe (most commonly the ground state) and quantum
fluctuations in that ground state, time-evolved through the inflationary era, are
identified with classical inhomogeneities. Quantum-mechanical predictions thus
play a role in our modelling of the Universe’s history, but not a role that the
Lab View seems remotely equipped to handle.
6 The Decoherent View
The last section may have read as a call to arms: the Lab View is inadequate,
so we must urgently seek an alternative way to do quantum mechanics! But
that would miss the point: as with the previous section’s discussion of experi-
mental physics beyond the Lab View, physicists manifestly are doing quantum
mechanics in these regimes, so they must already have a method for applying it
that goes beyond the Lab View.
In fact, the method is fairly obvious, and fairly similar to that we used in
section 4. The probability distribution over certain degrees of freedom — solar
energy density, radiation rate, modes of the inflaton field — is simply treated
as objective, as a probability distribution over actually-existing facts, and not
merely as something that is realised when an experiment is performed. So we
4Philosophers may recognise this as an instance of Quine’s classic objection to logical
positivism (Quine 1951) — the empirical predictions of particular applications of quantum
mechanics cannot be isolated from the influence of myriad other parts of our scientific world-
view.
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can say, for instance, not merely that a given mode of the primordial inflaton
field would have had probability such-and-such of having a given amplitude if
we were to measure it (whatever that means operationally), but that it actually
did have probability such-and-such of that amplitude.
Now, it’s tempting to imagine extending this objective take on quantum
probabilities to all such probabilities: to interpret a quantum system as having
some objectively-possessed value of every observable, and the quantum state as
simply an economical way of coding a probability distribution over those observ-
ables. But this cannot be done. A collection of formal results — the Kochen-
Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker 1967; Bell 1966, Redhead 1987, pp.119–
152, Mermin 1993); Gleason’s theorem (Gleason 1957, Redhead 1987, pp.27–9,
Peres 1993, pp.190–195 Caves et al 2004); the Bub-Clifton theorem (Bub and
Clifton 1996; Bub, Clifton, and Goldstein 2000); the PBR theorem and its rela-
tives (Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 2011; Maroney 2012; Leifer 2014)) — estab-
lish that reading quantum mechanics along these lines — as bearing the same
relation to some underlying objective theory as classical statistical mechanics
bears to classical mechanics — is pretty much5 impossible.
In fact, the central problem can be appreciated without getting into the
details of these results. To take an objective view of some physical quantity
is to suppose that the quantity has a definite value at each instant of time, so
that we can consider the various possible histories of that quantity (that is: the
various ways it can evolve over time) and assign probabilities to each. But the
phenomena of interference means that this does not generically work in quantum
mechanics. The quantum formalism for (say) the two slit experiment assigns
a well-defined probability P1(x) to the history where the particle goes through
Slit One and then hits some point x on the screen, and a similarly-well-defined
probability P2(x) to it hitting point x via Slit Two, but of course the probability
of it hitting point x at all (irrespectively of which slit it goes through) is not in
general P1(x) + P2(x). So the ‘probabilities’ assigned to these two histories do
not obey the probability calculus. And things that don’t obey the probability
calculus are not probabilities at all.
At a fundamental level, the problem is that quantum mechanics is a dy-
namical theory about amplitudes, not about probabilities. The amplitudes of
the two histories in the two-slit experiment sum perfectly happily to give the
amplitude of the particle reaching the slit, but amplitudes are not probabilities,
and in giving rise to probabilities they can cancel out or reinforce.
However, in most physical applications of quantum theory — and, in par-
ticular, in cosmology — we are not working ‘at a fundamental level’, which is
to say that we are not attempting the usually-impossible task of deducing (far
less interpreting) the evolution of the full quantum state over time. Rather,
5A more precise statement would be “impossible unless that underlying objective theory
has a number of extremely pathological-seeming features.” It is not universally accepted that
this rules out such theories, though; see, e. g. , Spekkens (2007) and Leifer (2014) for further
discussion. From the perspective of this article, such strategies share with the modificatory
strategies of section 2 the feature that they require us to redo post-1930s physics, and so are
(to say the least) not suitable in their current form to make sense of contemporary cosmology.
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we are interested in finding higher-level, emergent dynamics, whereby we can
write down dynamical equations for, and make predictions about, certain de-
grees of freedom of a system without having to keep track of all the remaining
degrees of freedom. In the examples of the previous section, for instance, we
have considered:
• The robust relations between macrostates of measuring devices and states
of the system being measured, abstracting over the microscopic details of
the measuring devices
• The bulk thermal properties of the core of the Sun, abstracting over the
vast number of microstates compatible with those bulk thermal properties
• The low-wavelength modes of the inflaton field which are responsible for
primordial inhomogeneities, abstracting over the high-wavelength degrees
of freedom and the various other fields present.
In each case, we can derive from the quantum-mechanical dynamics an au-
tonomous system of dynamical equations for these degrees of freedom. In each
case, we can also derive from the Born Rule a time-dependent probability dis-
tribution over the values of those degrees of freedom. And in each case, that
probability distribution defines a probability over histories that obeys the prob-
ability calculus. In each case, then, we are justified — at least formally, if
perhaps not philosophically — in studying the autonomous dynamical system
in question as telling us how these degrees of freedom are actually evolving,
quite independently of our measurement processes.
This view of quantum physics is, in effect, the Objective View, but applied
not to our fundamental physics but to certain higher-level dynamical theories
emergent from that physics. It allows us to derive the validity of the Lab View
in the particular context of well-controlled experiments. And it is, in practice,
what is used — tacitly or explicitly — in applications of quantum theory that
go beyond the confines of the Lab View.
Historically speaking, the first explicit statement of this view was by Gell-
Mann and Hartle (1993). They and others6 and had already developed a for-
malism — the ‘consistent histories’ or ‘decoherent histories’ formalism — that
gives a criterion for when the quantum probability distribution over a given
degree of freedom obeys the probability calculus. But, as they recognised, this
fact by itself is not nearly strong enough to justify interpreting that degree of
freedom objectively (indeed, and as stressed by Dowker and Kent (1996), the
decoherent-history condition will generically be satisfied by a very large number
of observables, most of which are pathologically non-classical). What is required
— again, speaking just pragmatically and postponing the deeper interpretative
questions — is not just a kinematics that can be described probabilistically, but
a probabilistic dynamics. And that requires the behaviour of the objectively-
interpretable degrees of freedom to be autonomous, to satisfy its own self-pp
6See in particular Gell-Mann and Hartle (1989), Griffiths (1984) and Omnes (1988); for
more detailed references and a general review, see Halliwell (1995).
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Borrowing Gell-Mann and Hartle’s terminology, I call this emergently-objective
view of quantum physics the Decoherent View.
7 Conditions for decoherence
Physical experience has provided us with a fairly good understanding of how to
treat the dynamics of some subset S of the degrees of freedom of a large complex
system. There are three possibilities. At one extreme these degrees of freedom
may be dynamically decoupled from the remaining degrees of freedom, so that
the equations of motion decompose into entirely separate equations for the two
sets of dynamical variables. This in turn might occur because the degrees of
freedom in S represent some subsystem spatially isolated from other systems; it
might also occur where special features of the dynamics disconnect them from
other degrees of freedom (as occurs, for instance, for the various modes of a free
field, or for the centre-of-mass degree of freedom of a collection of particles).
Call this case Full Autonomy.
At the other extreme — No Autonomy — it may be that the behaviour of
degrees of freedom in S cannot be determined without fine-grained knowledge
of the remaining degrees of freedom. In this case, the degrees of freedom in S
cannot be said to represent a dynamically autonomous subsystem at all, but are
just a partial description of a complex interacting whole.
The intermediate case is that described by non-equilibrium statistical me-
chanics. Here, typically, the degrees of freedom in S represent some coarse-
grained, collective properties of a very complex system, and while the influence
of the residual degrees of freedom on S cannot be ignored, those degrees of
freedom are so numerous, and individually so insignificant in their effects, that
we can get away with taking a statistical average over their effects rather than
tracking each one individually. In this case — Statistical Autonomy — it re-
mains possible to write down a closed-form dynamical equation of motion for S,
but that equation of motion is not the same as would apply if the interactions
between S and the rest of the system were ignored. For instance, the effect of
air resistance on a moving body can be analysed this way by averaging over
the air molecules; so can Brownian motion, by using a probabilistic discription
of the molecules that kick the pollen grain around. The validity of statistical
autonomy is usually not absolute: some general assumptions have to be made
about the initial state of the degrees of freedom not included in S (indeed,
the equations of motion of statistically autonomous systems are typically not
time-reversal invariant, which as a matter of logic requires some kind of state
restriction). But once such general assumptions are made, the dynamics of S
can be studied without further fine-grained information about other degrees of
freedom.
Both Full Autonomy and Statistical Autonomy can give rise, in the right
circumstances, to decoherence.7 To begin with Full Autonomy: if a system’s
7For detailed references to the decoherence literature, see Joos et al (2003) or Schlosshauer
(2006).
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Hamiltonian is quadratic in canonical position and momentum variables (as for
a free particle, a harmonic oscillator or system of coupled harmonic oscillators,
or a free field) then the quantum probability distributions over these variables
evolve exactly as would be predicted from the classical equations of motion. For
instance, the spreading out of a free particle wavefunction is formally identical
to the spreading out of a probability distribution over the position and momen-
tum of a free classical particle. (A helpful way to visualise this is through the
Wigner function representation (Wigner 1932) which represents a quantum state
as a real (albeit sometimes negative) function on phase space; the Schro¨dinger
equation, in this representation, is given by the Liouville equation of classical
physics supplemented by quantum correction terms that vanish if the Hamilto-
nian is quadratic. See Zurek and Paz (1995) or Wallace (2012, ch.3) for further
discussion.)
However, this route to decoherence is somewhat delicate. Non-quadratic
terms in a system’s self-Hamiltonian can break the quantum-classical correspon-
dence on relatively short timescales (cf (Zurek and Paz 1995)), and interactions
with other systems, such as measurement devices, will also break it (consider
the apparently-classical free-particle wave-packet after it interacts with a double
slit and then a particle-detector screen). Robust decoherence requires more.
More is provided in a large fraction of those contexts where Statistical Au-
tonomy holds. The central idea here is that the large number of residual degrees
of freedom being treated statistically are constantly recording the state of the
system, in the sense that their own states are strongly affected by the state of
the system. (In the case of Brownian motion, for instance, collisions between
an individual gas particle and the pollen grain have only minor effects on the
state of the grain, but dramatic effects on the state of the gas particle.) This
constant measurement (a) picks out a particular ‘preferred basis’ with which the
measurement occurs (typically a basis of narrow wavepackets in nonrelativistic
particle mechanics, or a coherent-state basis in (bosonic) field theory), and (b)
ensures that the probability distribution over the observables defining that pre-
ferred basis evolves in a way that can be interpreted as a classical stochastic
process — i. e. , in a way where interference is almost entirely suppressed.
This form of ‘environment-induced’ decoherence is highly robust against dis-
ruption by external measurement processes. If the environment is constantly
measuring the system with respect to a given basis, on timescales much shorter
than any realistic human interferences, that’s the only basis with respect to
which it’s physically viable to measure the system, and that additional mea-
surement will make no further difference to a system’s evolution.
It’s helpful to distinguish two sorts of ‘environment’ in environment-induced
decoherence. The most commonly discussed is a physically-external environ-
ment — in nonrelativistic cases, the atmosphere, stellar radiation, or even the
microwave background radiation are all appealed to. But it is equally possible
for a system’s own small-scale degrees of freedom to decohere it. Schro¨dinger’s
unfortunate cat, for instance, has autonomous dynamics (the general behaviour
of cats can be predicted, at least qualitatively, without fine-grained information
on their exact microstate) but the microscopic degrees of freedom of the cat are
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quite capable of recording, quickly and redundantly, whether it is dead or not,
without any need for an external environment.
8 Two models of decoherence: mundane and
cosmological
As an illustrative model where all these mechanisms of decoherence play out,
consider the classic case of a needle (assumed rotationally invariant at least in
its macroscopic shape) balanced exactly on its end. In (highly implausible8)
idealisation, we can treat the quantum state of the needle’s centre of mass
as a rotationally-invariant Gaussian pure state, placed exactly at the unstable
equilibrium point. Then:
1. The Hamiltonian for that centre of mass can be approximated, close to the
equilibrium point, as an upside-down harmonic oscillator. As long as we
are interested only in the evolution of the needle in isolation, then, it can
formally be treated as classical. The wave-packet will evolve into an ex-
panding ring, and the evolution of the probability distributions defined by
the ring is exactly that of a classical ensemble of needles distributed, sym-
metrically, close to the equilibrium point. However, the system remains
in a coherent superposition and subsequent interactions could reveal that
— were it not that
2. The atomic lattice of the needle is not rotationally invariant at the micro
level and (while I have not analysed an explicit model) it is realistically
almost certain that higher-frequency vibrational modes in the needle will
couple to its centre of mass so as to quickly and redundantly record the
position of the latter in the states of the former; and
3. Even if the internal degrees of freedom of the needle are entirely neglected,
interactions between the needle and the atmosphere, or with ambient
light, wil record the position of the needle’s centre of mass on very short
timescales.
As a result, the needle can be treated for all intents and purposes (that is:
for the purposes of any measurement we might make of it) just as if it were
a classical needle, with all the probabilities indistinguishable from those that
would arise from classical ignorance about its initial position.
In fact, pretty much this same structure can be seen if we look at decoherence
in the inflation era. Standard treatments (see, e. g. , Weinberg 2008) consider a
free scalar inflaton field, which can be analysed into modes each of which may
be treated as an inverted simple harmonic oscillator. Then:
8For macroscopic needles, any realistic process will prepare the needle in a highly mixed
state; if we somehow managed to prepare it in a pure state after all, we would not realistically
be able to position it exactly centered on the equilibrium point.
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1. The evolution of the probability distribution for level of excitation of that
mode can be treated, as long as the free-field assumption is valid, as if
it were a classical probability distribution, though this by itself is not a
robust route to classicality (Guth and Pi 1985; Polarski and Starobinsky
1996);
2. Assuming that the inflaton field is not exactly free, then interaction terms
between the long-wavelength inflaton-field modes that determine the ob-
served microwave-background-radiation flluctuation and which control struc-
ture formation, and the far-more-numerous shorter-wavelength modes, can
be expected to rapidly decohere the former with respect to a basis of co-
herent states — i. e. , of wavepackets around definite configurations of the
long-wavelength part of the inflaton field.(Lombardo and Nacir 2005)
3. Interactions with other dynamical degrees of freedom (such as electromag-
netic or gravitational radiation scattered by inhomogeneities) will also
serve to decohere the long-wavelength modes with respect to that ba-
sis.(Calzetta and Hu 1995; Keifer, Polarski, and Starobinsky 1998)
So the Decoherent View can be consistently applied to the low-wavelength
part of the inflaton field, just as with the needle. The recipe for using quantum
mechanics that is — I have claimed — tacit in non-cosmological uses of the
theory also works fine in its most important cosmological application.
9 Interpreting quantum theory in the cosmolog-
ical context
To sum up: the Lab View of quantum mechanics, in which measurement is
a primitive and an external observer is essential, is inadequate even for non-
cosmological applications of quantum theory and doubly inadequate in cosmol-
ogy. In fact we make sense of quantum theory outside lab contexts by applying
the Objective View not to the theory as a whole, but to higher-level theories
derived from it, in which the various processes that lead to decoherence have
suppressed interference and enabled us to interpret the evolving probabilities of
those theories in a classical fashion. In this context, the traditional name for the
problem of how to interpret quantum theory — the “Measurement Problem” is
out of place, for we can state the theory formally, and extract empirical content
from it, without any talk of measurement.
So what is that problem of interpretation? It is this: to get an understanding
of quantum theory — or a modification thereof — as an objective account of
the world — as something to which the Objective View can after all be applied
— or else to find some satisfactory way of thinking about quantum theory
other than through the Objective View. And either way, that understanding
must reproduce the Decoherent View, since that is how quantum theory makes
contact with experiment.
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We have already considered the modificatory strategies. At least in cos-
mology, they have to be thought of as incomplete research programs, not as
complete alternatives awaiting philosopihical consideration. The physics of the
inflaton field, in particular, is an application of quantum gravity (albeit in its
perturbative form): the non-dynamical part of the metric field fluctuates with
the inflaton field (cf Weinberg (2008, pp.470–474)), and the scattering of gravi-
tons off the inflaton field is a coupling of gravitational degrees of freedom to
matter. No extant dynamical-collapse or hidden-variables theory, to the best
of my knowledge, has even come close to a (non-phenomenological) account of
this physics.
What about alternatives to the Objective View? Sometimes the famous9
instruction to “shut up and calculate” is taken as an alternative interpretation.
But this is to misread the instruction. It is not a proposed way to understand
quantum mechanics, but an instruction not to try — or, more charitably, as
a statement that the speaker does not want to try. There is nothing wrong
with that: not everyone working in quantum mechanics needs to try to solve its
conceptual problems, and indeed we would understand the theory conceptually
much less well than we do if no-one had just ploughed ahead and calculated. But
as far as the interpretation of quantum mechanics is concerned, true adherents of
“shut up and calculate” are properly silent. They are calculating, and shutting
up.
A genuine alternative to the Objective View would be a positive philosophy
of science that could be successfully applied to quantum theory and from which
the validity of the Decoherent View would follow. One possibility would be
to make sense of the Decoherent View on its own terms. In particular, the
‘dappled world’ approach of Nancy Cartwright (1983, 1999) abandons any idea
that theories in physics should be seen as all derivable from one underlying
theory, and treats the subject in piecemeal fashion, with each particular physics
model applicable to certain systems and not in general extendible beyond those
systems. (Ladyman and Ross (2013) explore a similar approach.) In approaches
of this kind, the search for a systematic interpretation of quantum mechanics
may simply be misconceived: we should instead interpret, on their own merits,
each of the various higher-level theories that emerge from decoherence. Here we
maintain the virtues of the Objective View at the cost of abandoing the search
for unification.
Alternatively, we could look for some unified understanding of quantum
theory that avoids the observer-independent, third-party-science approach of
the Objective View but that breaks loose from the lab-based confines of ear-
lier attempts at such an understanding. Carlo Rovelli’s relational approach to
quantum theory, for instance (Rovelli 2004, pp.209–222) holds onto the idea
that quantum theory is always a description of one system from the perspec-
tive of another system, but drops the Copenhagen requirement that that second
system is automatically a classical measurement device.
9It is usually attributed to Feynman, but David Mermin appears to be the real author; cf
Mermin (2004).
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Space does not permit me to do justice to these subtle and well-motivated
ideas — but they share a common problem. Namely: this doesn’t actually
seem to be how we do quantum mechanics in practice. The various high-level
theories derived from underlying physics via decoherence do indeed seem to be
derived, not simply postulated independently of the physics: the whole point of
inflation, in particular, is that it offers an underlying quantum derivation for
the already-known phenomenological description of primordial inhomogeneity
— and a derivation, indeed, that makes quantitative predictions for the free
parameters in that description. And that “underlying physics” seems to be
treated as a closed physical system, evolving unitarily and described without
any appeal to other systems.
And that brings us back to the Objective View — and to the Everett inter-
pretation. For a Universe objectively described by unitary quantum mechanics,
and with a dynamics like that of our Universe, will be such that various of its
subsystems will have autonomous high-level dynamics with the formal struc-
ture of a classical probabilistic theory. And in particular, the dynamics of any
process of measurement will have to be such an ‘autonomous high-level dynam-
ics’, either because (as in cosmology) the system being measured is thoroughly
decohered by already-present interactions, or because (as in lab-based physics)
the act of coupling a microscopic degree of freedom to a macroscopic lab-device
degree of freedom brings into being such a dynamics. Everett’s proposal —
which originated precisely in the desire for an approach to quantum mechanics
adequate for cosmology (Everett 1957) — is simply to treat the process of mea-
surement physically in this way, so that a unitarily-evolving Universe appears,
with respect to those regimes accessible to any physically-realised observer or
measurement process, as a classical system with probabilistic dynamics. That
is: the Everett interpretation is simply the reaffirmation of the Objective View
of physics as valid for unmodified quantum physics, together with a detailed
analysis of the physics of the quantum-classical transition and of the measure-
ment process so as to show that the apparent impossibility of that Objective
view is only apparent.
This is not a cost-free move. The reason why the state of the low-wavelength
modes of the inflaton field can be treated as a classical probabilistic mixture is
because they are thoroughly entangled with innumerable other degrees of free-
dom. But there is no precise point in the system’s evolution where that entan-
glement becomes so thorough that interference exactly vanishes, no preferred
instant at which we can imagine adding a non-unitary ‘collapse’ to the theory
that eliminates all but one term in the superposition of low-wavelength field
values. So taking the Objective View towards the quantum theory of the early
Universe requires us to take the full quantum state of that early Universe as a
faithful representation of the underlying physics. Since that full state is a super-
position of rapidly-decohering terms only one of which we take to describe the
actually-observed universe, but the formalism in no way picks that one term out
from the others, this amounts to treating quantum theory as describing a vast
ensemble of classical universes — an ‘emergent multiverse’, as I have elsewhere
called it (Wallace 2012), since the ‘universes’ emerge from the formalism only
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in the regime in which decoherence applies and in which we can formally treat
their mod-squared amplitudes as probabilities.
Since on a formal, technical level ‘the Everett interpretation’ is just the
observer-independent, decoherence-based quantum theory, almost by definition
its problems are philosophical rather than technical. The most-discussed in-
clude:
Micro-ontology: I have spoken of classical physics (or, more properly, the
many instances of classical physics applicable to many different degrees
of freedom) as ‘emerging’ from the underlying quantum description. But
both the cohesion of that underlying description, and of the process of
emergence, have been questioned; in particular, a number of philoso-
phers (Allori et al 2008, Maudlin 2010; Allori 2013, Esfeld et al 2014,
Esfeld, Deckert, and Oldofredi 2015) have advocated a very conservative
take on ‘fundamental’ physics in which it necessarily makes contact with
empirical data through claims about bodies with definite locations in space
and time. On such an account, superpositions of different matter distri-
butions — let alone of spacetime structure itself — are difficult to make
sense of. (See Wallace (2010), or Wallace (2012, chapters 2 and 8), for
my approach to these concerns; see also Bacciagaluppi and Ismael (2015,
pp.146–7).)
Probability: “Probabilities” in Everett-interpreted quantum mechanics are
Born-rule-calculated weights of terms in a superposition, in those regimes
where decoherence means that those weights evolve without interference
effects being significant. It’s fair to say that this is radically different
from any previously-entertained approach to probability (such as proba-
bilities as relative frequencies, or as expressions of subjective ignorance,
or as primitive) and critics (such as Albert (2010), Price (2010) and Kent
(2010)) have claimed that it is unintelligible to treat these weights as prob-
abilities in any more than a formal sense. Responses fall into two cate-
gories: positive responses (Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann 1989; Deutsch
1999; Zurek 2005; Greaves and Myrvold 2010, Wallace 2012, ch.5, Carroll
and Sebens 2013) that attempt to demonstrate that the branch weights
are (or at least play the role of) probability, and negative responses (Saun-
ders 1995, 1998, Papineau 1996, 2010, Wallace 2012, ch.4) that argue that
probability is at any rate no more conceptually puzzling in quantum than
in classical mechanics.
Extravagance: The most common jibe about the Everett interpretation in
informal discussions is that it is unreasonable and even unscientific for a
theory to postulate such an extravagant ontology, especially as so little of
it is observable. (Though, as I discuss in more detail in Wallace (2012,
chapter 1), taking unobservable consequences of our best theories seriously
is routine in science, and as Tegmark (2007) stresses, the extravagance
of the Everettian multiverse is actually pretty mild by the standards of
modern cosmology!)
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10 Conclusion: The conservatism of the Everett
interpretation
Detailed engagement with any of the objections above lies well beyond this arti-
cle and I can only refer the reader to the references I provide. I want to conclude
this discussion on a different point: that whether or not the Everett interpre-
tation itself makes sense, it is about the only approach to quantum mechanics
that makes sense of the way quantum mechanics is used in cosmology. Physi-
cists working on the inflaton field — or on any other application of quantum
theory outside some stylised lab contexts — do not work with (usually do not
even have!) alternative theories to quantum mechanics; they do not adopt per-
spectival approaches to quantum theory where the degrees of freedom studies
are always relativised to others; they do not treat higher-level processes as phe-
nomenological primitives. They treat the system they are studying, in the first
instance, as unitarily evolving and closed; they extract from that theory, more
or less explicitly, higher-level dynamics and higher-level descriptions to which
the Born rule can be consistently applied, and they connect to observations via
that application.
Philosophers of science sometimes talk of the philosophical position tacitly
held by practising scientists. They do not mean the answers that those scien-
tists give to explicit questions about philosophy; as Tim Williamson (private
conversation) once observed, the answers given tend to be whatever gets rid
of the inquring philosopher most expediently! They mean the philosophical
position that those practicing scientists would have to hold if their scientific
activity were to make sense. (In this sense, it is fairly widely accepted — even
by philosophers who are themselves sceptical about scientific realism — that
scientists themselves are realists in at least some extended sense.)
The practice of those physicists who apply quantum theory to cosmology
makes sense if those physicists are tacitly committed to the Everett interpreta-
tion (whether or not that commitment fails to recognise some deep pathology
in that interpretation). So far as I can see, it does not make sense on any other
interpretation of quantum mechanics. So cosmologists, when applying quantum
mechanics, are tacitly committed to the Everett interpretation. (And in some
cases, such as Hawking (1976),Weinberg (2002, p.233), or the quotation from
Hartle that began this chapter, the commitment becomes explicit.)
Are they right to be so committed? In my view, yes, but I have not argued for
it here. But to think otherwise seems to commit one to advocating a significant
revision of physical practice, and perhaps of physics itself, on the basis of a priori
philosophical objections and in the absence of the more naturalistic reasons that
drove Everett, Zeh, Zurek, Gell-Mann, Hartle, Halliwell and many others to
develop an approach to using quantum physics that avoids the deficiencies of the
Lab View. My confidence in that approach’s philosophical coherence is grounded
only partially in the specific arguments, and partially in the observation that
history has not been kind to attempts to revise scientific practice on a priori
grounds.
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